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The terms 
of China’s 
engagement are 
unapologetically 
authoritarian 
and explicitly 
rival the West’s 
human rights 
and democracy-
focused analog.
‘‘
‘‘
IntroductIon: chIna’s rIse and 
southeast asIa’s tepId response
China is challenging the United States in Southeast 
Asia, bringing the region closer economically through 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and enlisting 
governments in the region to back Beijing’s political 
stances. Some observers in the American and foreign 
press, citing China’s increased influence and the US’s 
diplomatic retrenchment under President Donald 
Trump, have declared the end of decades-long US 
predominance in Southeast Asia, deeming it to have 
been supplanted by China. Headlines indeed scream 
‘crisis,’ but the reality is far more complex: Beijing’s 
efforts in Southeast Asia have a ceiling provided by 
Southeast Asians’ long-running preference for the 
US. Washington, despite ongoing missteps, evidently 
remains well-positioned to challenge Beijing’s 
premature bid1 for regional hegemony.
The character of Southeast Asia’s governments 
generally determines the level to which they engage 
with China: One-party Cambodia and Laos, along with 
the increasingly autocratic Myanmar and Thailand, 
are generally most interested in China’s offers. These 
countries’ leaders seek to solidify their respective 
grips on power amidst middling (and in some cases 
declining) domestic support and increased Western 
pressure; China, in return for certain (geo)political 
goods, backs them and supports development 
projects aimed to engender local goodwill for these 
leaders. Alternatively, the more democratic Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Philippines have better balanced the 
US and China. This is unsurprising, given that states 
with stronger traditions of democracy and human 
rights generally prefer the international community to 
China, as is the case in Latin America.2 And while the 
Indonesian, Malaysian, and Philippines governments 
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still see the Belt and Road Initiative as a 
way to fund development that will bolster 
their public support, citizens of these 
countries are increasingly anti-China or 
at least China-skeptical. Additionally, 
Singapore, although autocratic, is a 
rich city-state awash in Western capital 
and influence, rendering it more able to 
balance the US and China and less in need 
of Chinese development investment. 
It’s evidently too soon to write off 
Southeast Asia as Beijing-aligned and 
lost to Washington. Still, the absence 
of Western financing as a viable 
alternative keeps driving Southeast Asian 
governments, irrespective of regime type, 
back into Beijing’s arms. But Chinese 
victory is not guaranteed, despite Trump’s 
diplomatic blunders. The US remains 
Southeast Asia’s favoured great power; 
Washington needs only a coherent plan—
and perhaps a new commander-in-chief—to 
cement its enduring strength in the region. 
the southeast asIan polItIcal 
envIronment and chIna
Democracy is under siege in Southeast 
Asia. In recent memory, Thailand and the 
Philippines have experienced democratic 
recessions, Myanmar’s liberalization has 
stalled, while Singapore has maintained 
its autocratic efficiency. Indonesia and 
Malaysia are two notable exceptions, with 
both witnessing multiple peaceful transfers 
of power in recent years. Still, Southeast 
Asia’s significant backsliding in rights 
and freedoms has rendered the region 
ripe for Chinese influence, as developing 
autocratic countries are the most receptive 
to Beijing.3 4 This is partly because of the 
“South-South” solidarity partnerships 
on offer—which Chinese foreign 
minister Wang Yi defines as a “peaceful 
collaboration according to the norms of 
justice and fairness”—but which would 
be better described as Beijing’s promise 
of non-interference in regimes’ unsavory 
human rights issues.5 The terms of 
China’s engagement are unapologetically 
authoritarian and explicitly rival the West’s 
human rights and democracy-focused 
analog. As a result, what China puts 
forward is understandably attractive to 
Cambodia’s Hun Sen, Thailand’s Prayut 
Chan-o-cha, and Laos’s Bounnhang 
Vorachith and others who are interested 
in protecting their own regimes’ interests 
and, perhaps secondarily, in weakening 
Western power.6
Despite “no strings attached” 
assurances, Chinese aid does come with 
some obligations to Beijing’s political 
objectives, such as upholding the “one 
China” policy regarding Taiwan and 
ignoring the detention of Uighur and other 
Muslims in Xinjiang Province.7 On balance, 
authoritarians in the region and around 
the world—even those leading Muslim 
countries—have considered this a relatively 
marginal price to pay. It is, therefore, 
unsurprising that China exerts significant 
influence over many Southeast Asian 
governments. It is also no surprise that 
Cambodia and Laos—two of the region’s 
poorest and most autocratic countries—
have become near vassals of Beijing. 
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chIna’s agenda In southeast asIa 
Southeast Asia holds a special place in 
China’s policy mind due to the region’s 
geography, its historical and economic 
ties to China, and the around 30 million 
of ethnic Chinese scattered throughout.8 
Since the early 2010s Beijing has pursued 
increased friendliness with these countries 
through a form of neighbourhood 
diplomacy designed to turn Southeast Asia 
into a “community of common destiny” 
(CCD), an idea described by Chinese 
officials in terms of inclusiveness and 
win-win cooperation. Chinese leader 
Xi Jinping delineated this neighbour-
centric foreign policy in 2013, echoing his 
predecessor Hu Jintao to say that Chinese 
diplomats should “[let] the awareness of 
community of common destiny take root 
in neighbouring countries.”9 Ultimately, as 
Hoang Thi Ha writes, CCD rhetoric injects 
“a deterministic sense of inevitability in the 
intertwined destiny” of China and ASEAN 
in attempts to integrate Southeast Asian 
states into a Sino-centric political, cultural, 
and security network to rival the US.10 
Beijing has made headway on promoting 
this view, as was evident throughout Xi’s 
mid-January visit to Myanmar, during which 
the two countries inked dozens of BRI 
deals. Myanmar’s de facto leader Aung San 
Suu Kyi also told reporters: “It goes without 
saying that a neighbouring country has no 
other choice but to stand together [with 
China] till the end of the world.”11
Broadly speaking, Beijing hopes to win 
over Southeast Asia through financial and 
political support, ultimately folding the 
region into “a harmonious global order 
without the overlay of Western influence,” 
as Chris Alden and Ana Cristina Alves 
note.12 The BRI is the most visible form 
of China’s economic statecraft, but other 
BRI-connected sub-regional initiatives like 
the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) 
should not be overlooked. The LMC has 
$22 billion at its disposal, and Laos and 
Cambodia, its top beneficiaries, were 
the first countries to sign bilateral plans 
endorsing China’s CCD vision.13 China’s 
economic statecraft is also important 
domestically as it allows for the export 
of excess Chinese labor, capital, and 
capacity—thereby tamping concerns 
at home about unemployment, asset 
bubbles, falling profits, and, most worrying 
for Beijing, stagnant growth.14 15 China 
is also now “looking into the possibility 
of relocating some low-skilled, highly 
polluting industries to other countries,” 
including those in Southeast Asia.16
China employs a range of other 
policies in Southeast Asia, including 
reconnecting with the Chinese diaspora 
there to strengthen its relationship with 
Southeast Asian countries and influence 
their politics. 17 Beijing has also been more 
aggressive in the South China Sea, building 
islands there—much to the dismay of some 
Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, 
China has managed to defend its claims to 
the Sea by leaning namely on Cambodia, 
perhaps its most loyal ASEAN member, to 
veto the body’s resolutions on the issue. 
China views Southeast Asia as a means 
to many ends: It’s a region of special 
cultural and historical interest in which 
China seeks to forge anti-US political 
LSE IDEAS Strategic Update   |  March 20208
unity, open business opportunities to Chinese firms, and 
to which it can export human and technical overcapacity 
to satisfy domestic concerns. Indeed, compared to other 
peripheral regions, Southeast Asia is the most important 
and accessible gateway for China’s global expansion. 18
people problems
Beijing may have the backing of some of Southeast Asia’s 
ruling regimes, but the ruled remain skeptical. Anti-Chinese 
sentiment is rising,19 and it has become most evident 
in Cambodia,20 Vietnam,21 the Philippines,22 Indonesia,23 
and Malaysia.24 What’s more, when polled by the Pew 
Research Center in 2014, every Southeast Asian nation 
with the exception of Malaysia deemed China its top threat; 
a staggering 93 percent of Filipinos and 84 percent of 
Vietnamese were concerned that disputes between China 
and its neighbours could lead to military conflict.25 (That 
said, the Philippines under Rodrigo Duterte is unpredictable, 
and, in a move that could significantly weaken American 
influence in the region, it recently began the termination 
process of its Visiting Forces Agreement with the US.26) 
China also earned the lowest trust ranking among Southeast 
Asians in The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report.27 
The 2020 version of this report produced similar results, 
with 71 and 85 percent of respondents, Southeast Asian 
elites, saying they were worried about China’s economic and 
strategic influence, respectively.28 
The Southeast Asian public also remains pro-US. Ninety-
two percent of Filipinos, 90 percent of Vietnamese, 86 
percent of Burmese, 85 percent of Cambodians, 80 percent 
of Singaporeans, and 75 percent of Thais hold “strongly 
positive views” of the US’s impact in Southeast Asia.29 Only 
majority-Muslim Malaysia and Indonesia come in at less 
than 70 percent, thanks to President Trump’s anti-Muslim 
rhetoric. 30 Indeed, recently-ousted31 Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad in early February asked the 
American president “to resign to save America,” indicating 
disdain not for the US but for Trump specifically.32 It’s 
unclear how Mahathir’s successor, Muhyiddin Yassin, will 
approach China, but it is fair to assume that Malaysia under 
Beijing may have 
the backing of 
some of South-
east Asia’s ruling 
regimes, but the 
ruled remain 
skeptical.
‘‘
‘‘
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his leadership will generally cooperate 
with China.33 Still, Malaysian anti-Chinese 
sentiment undermines the nation’s 
relationship with China. In 2018, Mahathir 
was elected prime minister on an explicitly 
anti-China platform. Soon after, he visited 
China to renegotiate BRI deals agreed to 
by his predecessor, warning publicly of a 
“new colonialism”34—“a pointed expression 
of Asian unease about China’s increasing 
economic and political influence in the 
region,” Lucy Hornby writes in the Financial 
Times.35 Mahathir later implemented anti-
China policies at home36 and stood up to 
Beijing at sea.37 He continued, however, 
cooperating with China on BRI projects, 
saying that if forced to choose between 
Beijing and Washington, he would ally 
with the “rich” former rather than the 
fickle latter.38 And yet, the US-Malaysia 
relationship also remains positive. The US 
is the largest source of Malaysia’s total 
foreign direct investment,39 and Malaysian 
government bodies continue to publicly 
profess their interest in strengthened 
ties with the US.40 Although Malaysia’s 
BRI cooperation could rub against the 
US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, this has yet 
to happen. The US, if it avoids forcing 
Malaysia to choose between Washington 
and Beijing, will certainly retain significant 
influence in that country, particularly given 
extant anti-Chinese sentiment there.
Despite not necessarily being pro-US, 
Indonesians also hold anti-China views 
that undermine Beijing-Jakarta ties. A 
late 2019 poll showed that Indonesians 
believe China has become most influential 
country in Asia—but that Indonesian anti-
Chinese sentiment rose rapidly alongside 
this Chinese ascension.41 And while 
Jakarta looks to Beijing for infrastructure 
assistance, Indonesia continues to hedge 
and protect its own interests, as was 
most evident in December 2019, when 
Chinese coast guard ships escorted 
dozens of Chinese fishing boats through 
Indonesian waters—and Jakarta responded 
by deploying warships and four F-16 
jet fighters. The goal, according to an 
Indonesian military spokesman, was to drive 
China away without escalating tensions.42 
Indeed, Indonesia is among the most 
reluctant countries in Southeast Asia to 
choose between the US and China,43 and, 
unsurprisingly, it has continued cooperating 
with the US on security and counter-
terrorism matters even while spats over 
trade and the Jakarta-Beijing relationship 
persist. The US-Indonesia relationship is 
far from perfect, and their 2015 “strategic 
partnership” has yet to materialize, but 
Indonesia remains open to American efforts. 
For now, Southeast Asians are not 
ready to abandon the US for China, despite 
President Trump’s disquieting leadership.44 
The reality of anti-Chinese sentiment—
the result of elites in client countries 
attaining proximity to Chinese power 
and wealth at the public’s expense45—is 
a major hurdle for Beijing, one that is 
increasingly evident,46 and for which there 
is no American equivalent. If democracy 
were to take root in Southeast Asia, 
it’s apparent that anti-Chinese political 
movements would have a strong chance 
at claiming power across the region. And 
even without democracy, there is always 
the potential of anti-Chinese uprisings. “Not 
now,” a Cambodian man in Sihanoukville, 
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an overrun-by-Chinese Cambodian city, 
recently told The Atlantic when asked 
if Cambodians would soon take to the 
streets to protest the influx of Chinese into 
their country. “But if things keep getting 
worse for another year or two—yes.”47
dIscussIon: chInese mIght and 
southeast asIan concern
To most, it appears that China’s BRI-
centered influence-building efforts in 
Southeast Asia have been overwhelmingly 
successful. All eleven Southeast Asian 
nations are now BRI members. In addition, 
China has drawn Cambodia and Laos—and 
increasingly Myanmar—quite close, with 
those countries’ governments often doing 
Beijing’s political bidding. China may appear 
mighty, but might does not foster goodwill 
in those upon whom it is wielded. 
No issue looms larger over China-
Southeast Asia relations than China’s 2009 
unilateral declaration of sovereignty over 
more than 80 percent of the South China 
Sea. Chinese diplomats, for instance, 
during a 2016 meeting in Kunming, China, 
without any prior consultation asked 
ASEAN member state diplomats to sign a 
“consensus” paper addressing contentious 
issues including territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea. This gambit provoked 
visible anger from some of those with 
their own claims to the Sea, including the 
Philippines, Vietnamese, and Malaysian 
delegations.48 “The Chinese over-reached 
and backfired,” said one diplomat who 
attended the meeting. “There is a nicer 
way to say these things but instead their 
message was ‘We’re right and you’re 
wrong.’”49 China’s aggressiveness in this 
realm continues to provoke backlash. 
In 2019, a former senior Vietnamese 
foreign ministry official accused China 
of “intimidation and coercion,” even 
questioning whether Hanoi and Beijing 
could ever negotiate claims to the area in 
“good faith.”50 This Chinese bluntness is 
evident elsewhere in its diplomatic efforts 
and seems to be a weakness therein.51
Southeast Asian governments are 
also not entirely convinced by China for 
other reasons, including fears of debt 
diplomacy and frustration at the lack of 
local involvement in BRI projects. After 
seeing China’s Sri Lankan takeover—China 
in 2018 got Sri Lanka “to cough up a port” 
for 99 years52—Southeast Asian leaders 
are concerned that the BRI exposes 
them to similar “debt traps.”53 This fear is 
augmented by Southeast Asian frustration 
with the lack of local involvement in BRI 
projects. Leaders generally see the BRI 
as a means to create local jobs and, 
accordingly, gin up public support for their 
governments, but nearly 90 percent of 
BRI contractors are Chinese companies.54 
This is the result, as previously mentioned, 
of China’s need to export its domestic 
overcapacity, and does not come without 
costs: A BRI rail link in Laos has attracted 
local criticism for employing almost 
exclusively Chinese,55 while Cambodian 
Prime Minister Hun Sen keeps finding 
himself needing to justify the influx of 
Chinese who, rather than Cambodians, 
work on BRI projects56 and regularly 
denigrate their Cambodian counterparts,57 
generating widespread Cambodian anti-
Chinese sentiment in the process. 
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China’s own economic struggles may also hamper 
its Southeast Asian efforts. With trade, investment, 
consumer spending, and business confidence all in 
retreat, China’s economic growth has slowed to its 
lowest rate in 27 years,58 with some warning that its 
economy may slip further. This kind of slowdown, 
which would likely be exacerbated by the ongoing 
coronavirus crisis, has negative impacts for Southeast 
Asia, whose economies depend heavily on exports 
to China.59 If China is forced to purchase fewer 
goods from Southeast Asia, the region would likely 
turn to the West. Even now, every Southeast Asian 
country—including Cambodia and Laos—seeks 
to profit and benefit from their relationships with 
China and the West without forcing themselves 
to choose between Beijing and Washington. 
(Cambodia has not been particularly successful on 
this front.60) The BRI indicates that China is getting 
better at geopolitics, but many of its neighbours are 
evidently becoming increasingly clever as well. 
Anti-Chinese sentiment in Cambodia has 
skyrocketed as the Phnom Penh-Beijing relationship 
has intensified, indicating the broader superficiality 
of China’s Southeast Asian influence. Cambodia has 
for years readily absorbed many Chinese elements, 
but China’s newest advance is seriously straining this 
traditional amity.61 Indeed, anti-Chinese sentiment 
has become so widespread that Sen himself has 
had to publicly address the issue, while pro-regime 
newspapers have taken to publishing pro-China 
pieces written by Chinese propagandists.62 And 
although Sen’s grip on power remains strong, anti-
Chinese sentiment is becoming a proxy for anti-
ruling party sentiment and could threaten his son’s 
potential succession.63 The rest of Southeast Asia 
will face a similar problem if they deepen relations 
with China while downgrading those with the West, 
as Southeast Asians want ties with both Beijing and 
Washington (and Brussels and London). Therein 
lies China’s major problem: Despite the BRI’s merits, 
For now, Southeast 
Asians are not 
ready to abandon 
the US for China, 
despite President 
Trump’s disquieting 
leadership.
‘‘
‘‘
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Southeast Asia remains both wary of China 
and a reservoir of goodwill for the US. 
Cambodian politics also present 
China with a troubling conundrum. Sen’s 
successor, for reasons both unique to 
Cambodia and standard to patrimonial 
successions, will face significant public 
and elite opposition when he tries to 
take over.64 Given the widespread nature 
of Cambodian anti-Chinese sentiment, 
as well as the opposition’s anti-Chinese 
and pro-US rhetoric, it’s fair to assume 
that a non-Hun clan Cambodia would 
downgrade relations with China in favor 
of relations with the West. But China 
appears to be taking over two chunks of 
Cambodia for military purposes.65 Any 
Cambodian regime change and subsequent 
renegotiation of these plans would not be 
tolerable for China. The potential for anti-
Chinese political change like this is not, 
however, limited to Cambodia, as evinced 
by Malaysia’s election of Mahathir and 
the increasing popularity of anti-Chinese 
views elsewhere. It’s therefore notable 
that China, in a surprising break from its 
promised non-interference, has become 
somewhat active in Cambodian politics.66 
It remains unclear how Beijing might 
respond to a public uprising or regime 
change  that damages Chinese interests, 
but current behaviour seems to suggest 
an increased willingness to intervene.
If the West does not pivot back to Asia, 
albeit with more human rights concern than 
US President Barack Obama managed,67 
China could emerge dominant in Southeast 
Asia by default—even as Beijing’s popularity 
sags.68 Still, Chinese power remains 
“synonymous with brute strength, bribery 
and browbeating,” as Edward Wong 
writes in The New York Times,69 while US 
power is potent and widely seen as more 
benevolent. Barring a further collapse in 
diplomacy and strategy, the West, namely 
the US, is well-positioned to maintain some 
semblance of its regional predominance. 
conclusIon:  
WashIngton’s next steps
The US retains pole position in the race to 
win over Southeast Asia, but Washington 
needs to up its efforts. This is particularly 
important given Southeast Asian doubts 
regarding current American leadership: 
60 percent of US skeptics in the region 
say their confidence in Washington 
would increase if Trump were no longer 
president.70 Those numbers are particularly 
high in Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and 
Singapore—countries with most of the 
region’s Muslims who, as previously 
mentioned, have bristled at Trump’s 
constant anti-Muslim rhetoric. Although the 
US’s chief problem, an inability to focus on 
Southeast Asia, predates Trump, China’s 
foreign policy struggles are deeper and far 
more chronic, leaving the door open for 
the US. But the Trump administration has 
squandered, rather than taken advantage of, 
this opening. Its Free and Open Indo-Pacific
(FOIP) strategy unwisely singles out China 
for leveraging “predatory economics”71 to 
coerce countries into joining its fold without 
offering a reasonable alternative. Southeast 
Asians, meanwhile, concerned that China’s 
rise implies a binary choice between Beijing 
and Washington to which their governments 
will respond by choosing China,72 see 
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confirmation of that binary in FOIP. 
Even US partners like Vietnam maintain 
relations with Beijing. Telling Southeast 
Asia to choose between China—the nearby, 
predictable, and active option—and the 
increasingly distant and erratic US is self-
defeating, particularly given Washington’s 
inability to yet articulate a plan more 
attractive than the BRI. 
The West must, therefore, avoid creating 
rival blocs in Southeast Asia. The Cold War-
like implication that countries must choose 
sides does not apply there: compared 
to that era, the security environment is 
more benign and middle power countries 
have much more agency.73 In eras past, 
the US was able to bully states like 
Cambodia, a style no longer functional 
given that Cambodia is a Chinese ally but 
continues to receive American aid, and 
with whose government the US retains 
ties. Thailand and the Philippines have 
similarly cultivated warm ties with the 
US and China when it suits them. Clearly, 
in today’s world, these countries are not 
“pawns” on a chessboard, but “knights,” 
as longtime American diplomat Richard 
Armitage put it.74 Southeast Asia hungers 
for economic opportunities from both the 
United States and China and seeks to play 
the superpowers off one another. But if 
forced to choose, as Trump’s FOIP seems 
to imply they will be, Southeast Asian 
countries will begrudgingly go with China. 75
Washington’s Cold War era 
preoccupation with military spending 
also no longer makes sense. If Sen, for 
example, wants to coordinate militarily 
with China, as he already has, so be it; 
his forces are among the weakest in the 
world. The US, rather than focus militarily 
on Southeast Asia, should instead shift 
its resources to promoting economic 
development in the region as a means 
of capitalizing on extant pro-America 
sentiment. Mahathir in early 2019 said 
that “we have to go to the Chinese” for 
infrastructure.76 He was speaking about 
Malaysia, but the “we” can stand in for 
Southeast Asia writ large, given that the 
US has not articulated a tangible plan to 
rival the BRI. Doing so will be difficult, but 
the US must offer a multilateral regional 
proposal to provide alternative financing. 
As it has in Cambodia, Washington can 
further development without cementing 
authoritarianism by providing economic aid 
to sectors—agriculture and healthcare, for 
example—that are not directly controlled 
by autocrats. The US can also coordinate 
with regional partners to implement 
infrastructure development based on 
transparency and high environmental 
standards, both of which the BRI lacks.77 
The West’s goal should not be to directly 
confront the BRI, but to develop a 
compelling alternative to it “and then re-
engage China from a position of strength.”78
Furthermore, Trump must fill empty 
diplomatic positions and increase 
America’s presence in Southeast Asia. His 
summer 2019 installment of W. Patrick 
Murphy, a seasoned career diplomat, as 
ambassador to Cambodia is a strong start, 
and one that telegraphs Washington’s 
interest in Cambodia to Phnom Penh. 
Statements from the White House about 
Cambodia help that effort. It’s inexcusable, 
though, that US ambassadorships to 
ASEAN, the Philippines, and Singapore 
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remain without nominees, while Trump’s 
nominee for the Indonesian post has yet 
to be confirmed. China, of course, has 
ambassadors in each of those posts. 
It’s similarly shortsighted that the US cut 
funding for the Young South-East Asian 
Leaders Initiative, a vital supplement to 
official diplomacy and a low-cost, high-
impact way to reach young people in the 
youthful region.79 China, of course, has its 
own programmes designed to win over 
Southeast Asian youths.80 Additionally, 
US presidents also must not skip the 
Southeast Asian summits, as Trump did in 
2018 and 2019. The US sent to the 2019 
summit the lowest level of representation 
since 2011,81 embarrassing the host and 
traditional US partner Thailand. ASEAN 
leaders matched this lacking diplomacy by 
ditching a later meeting with US officials 
(leaders from Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam 
were the only ones to show up). 82 Trump’s 
planned Las Vegas March summit with all 
ten ASEAN states—since cancelled due to 
coronavirus fears83—was a step in the right 
direction. Regardless, the US’s continued 
absence indicates that Washington 
doesn’t care about Southeast Asia, a 
message that the region’s leaders evidently 
hear loud and clear. This indifference, 
amidst other American messaging of a 
forced choice between Washington and 
Beijing, fatalistically forces Southeast 
Asian leaders to side with China. 
Still, the US remains well positioned 
to cement its predominance in Southeast 
Asia. But doing so requires a more coherent 
approach from Washington, which will 
include coordination with Washington’s 
European, Australian, and Japanese allies. 
This increased focus must come in the 
form of a multilateral economic approach, 
a decreased focus on military power, the 
prioritization of diplomacy, and, as indicated 
by Trump’s low approval ratings throughout 
the region, perhaps a change in leadership. 
If the US takes such steps, Washington 
is likely to secure its preeminent status 
in Southeast Asia, despite China’s BRI-
paved influence inroads, and thanks to 
the anti-Chinese sentiment stemming 
from Beijing hegemonic hubris.84 But the 
clock is ticking, and the US cannot afford 
to let Southeast Asia languish in Beijing’s 
orbit much longer—for soon, the region is 
likely to see China as its only option. 
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